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The Myth of the Ever-Watchful Eye: The 
Inadequacy of Child Neglect Statutes in Illinois 
and Other States 
By: Kira Luciano* 
INTRODUCTION 
It was a warm July afternoon when Natasha Felix let her three sons—ages five, 
nine, and eleven—play outside with their nine-year-old cousin in the neighborhood park 
adjacent to their apartment.1 The children only spent about thirty minutes at the park and 
Natasha checked up on them every ten minutes from the apartment window.2 Natasha and 
other neighborhood mothers were grateful that they could let their children play and 
release their energy at a park so close to home.3 The children were playing happily when 
a preschool teacher visited the park with her class and assumed they were completely 
unsupervised.4 Instead of asking the children if they were alright or if an adult knew 
where they were, she left the park with her class and called the Illinois Department of 
Children and Family Services (DCFS) hotline.5 
DCFS investigated and eventually indicted Natasha for neglect under DCFS’s 
Allegation 74 for “Inadequate Supervision.” DCFS issued a citation indicating that two of 
the children had ADHD, the youngest child was five-years-old, and Natasha did not 
know that the children were running into the street with a scooter.6 Although Natasha 
immediately appealed DCFS’s decision with the help of a pro bono attorney and the 
Family Defense Center (FDC),7 the court affirmed its decision.8 The FDC appealed the 
case to the Illinois Appellate Court. Nearly two years later, with the help of legal 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2019; B.A. in Philosophy, University of Michigan, 
2014. Thank you to Dean and Professor Kimberly Yuracko for her guidance and expertise in the area of 
family law. I would also like to thank the editorial board of Northwestern’s Journal of Law & Social Policy 
for their hard work and valuable contributions to this note.  
1 Mother Fights Against Neglect Charge for Letting Kids Play, FAM. DEF. CTR., 
http://www.familydefensecenter.net/client-stories/mother-challenges-dcfs-decision-that-prevents-her-three-




5 Id.  
6 Opening Brief of Appellant-Plaintiff at 14, Felix v. Ill. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs. (2015) (No. 
14 CH 3999), https://www.familydefensecenter.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Natasha_F_Opening_Appellate_Brief.pdf [hereinafter Opening Appellate Brief].  
7 The Family Defense Center is an organization comprised of both staff and pro bono attorneys dedicated to 
reforming the child-welfare system, including DCFS, through impact litigation, legal assistance and policy 
reform. Mission and Story, FAM. DEF. CTR., https://www.familydefensecenter.net/about-us/mission-and-
story/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
8 Mother Fights Against Neglect Charge for Letting Kids Play, supra note 1.  
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advocacy along with attention from both local and national news outlets, DCFS finally 
reversed its decision in Natasha’s case and cleared her name.9  
In the Illinois Administrative Code’s Allegation 74, inadequate supervision occurs 
“when a child is placed at a real, significant and imminent risk of likely harm due to a 
parent or caregiver's blatant disregard of parental or caregiver responsibilities of care and 
support, including supervision.”10 Natasha is only one of many parents who have been 
unfairly targeted, investigated, and punished under Allegation 74.11 Moreover, the effects 
of Allegation 74 are not an isolated phenomenon, but are rather representative of a 
nationwide issue of overbroad, vague, and misapplied state child neglect statutes. To 
ameliorate the problematic effects of Allegation 74 on Illinois residents, DCFS should 
revise Allegation 74’s language to be specific and narrowly tailored. Furthermore, while 
all parents who are unfairly targeted by problematic child neglect laws deserve to have 
their stories heard, white, middle-class, and self-declared “free-range” parents are the 
archetype often portrayed as most affected by these laws.12 Narrowing the language of 
Allegation 74 will not only help “free-range” parents, but also will mitigate the 
inequitable effects on minority parents in low-income neighborhoods.  
To understand the development of child welfare laws, Part I of this Note briefly 
overviews the history and constitutional foundations of parental rights in the United 
States. To demonstrate the influences on problematic neglect statutes, this Part also 
includes a survey of federal and state child neglect statutes across the country, starting 
with the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA) and how it 
promoted issues of vagueness and overbreadth in certain state statutes. Part II overviews 
the origins and history of Allegation 74 in Illinois, while also discussing the problems 
with DCFS and its investigation process. This Part also discusses the effects Allegation 
74 has on Illinois families. Finally, Part III analyzes the policy implications of the 
overbroad application of Allegation 74 and proposes changes to address them. 
Particularly, it discusses how lower-income and minority families are more likely to be 
targeted and affected by neglect laws, including Allegation 74, and how “free-range” 
parents—while also subjected to overbroad applications of these laws—should not be the 
focus of outcry for this issue. Rather, the focus should be on the minority and lower-
income families who have fewer resources to fight these unwarranted claims. 
I. PARENTAL RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
The United States has a long history of protecting and promoting parental rights, 
particularly the right to decide how to best raise one’s children, on both the state and 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 300 App. B (2001). 
11 See Verified Class Action Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 6, Nicole P. v. Ill. Dep’t of 
Children and Family Servs. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 28, 2016) (No. 2016CH12809) [hereinafter Class Action 
Complaint], http://www.familydefensecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Nicole-P.-Complaint-with-
Exs-A-and-B-only.pdf.  
12 The free-range parenting movement, often credited to “freerangekids.com,” is a parenting style that 
encourages children “to take walks in nature, ride public transportation on their own and, generally, to get 
outside, stay active and acquire independent skills.” It is often seen as a counter-movement to “helicopter” 
(overprotective) parenting. Barbara J. King, Ready to Try Some Free-Range Parenting?, NPR (Apr. 12, 
2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/13.7/2015/04/12/399141301/ready-to-try-some-free-range-parenting. 
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federal level.13 The Maryland Supreme Court articulated its deference to parental 
decisions on how to rear children in Frye v. Frye:  
 
Our primary concern with regard to matters involving the parent-child 
relationship was the protection of family integrity and harmony and the 
protection of parental discretion in the discipline and care of the child. We 
have steadfastly recognized the authority of parents and their need to 
fulfill the functions devolved upon them by that position.14 
 
Tennessee also strongly defers to parental discretion, as reiterated in the 1994 case 
of Broadwell v. Holmes, in which the Tennessee Supreme Court stated that “Tennessee’s 
historically strong protection of parental rights” is rooted not only in the United States 
Constitution but Tennessee’s Constitution as well.15 Tennessee courts recognize the 
constitutional right of parents to raise their children “without unwarranted state 
intervention.”16 Under Utah’s Constitution, parents have a “fundamental liberty interest 
in the care, custody, and management of [their] children.”17 The fundamental liberty 
interest of parenting is also recognized by Florida’s Supreme Court.18 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of 
parental rights through a long line of cases dating back to the early twentieth century. In 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court first stated that parental liberties include the right to 
rear and educate the child and that “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”19 In 1944, the Court again 
recognized in Prince v. Massachusetts the fundamental right to parent: “[i]t is cardinal 
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder.”20 The most prominent affirmation of parents’ fundamental right to 
make their own child-rearing decisions comes from Troxel v. Granville in 2000: “[t]he 
liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and 
control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court.”21 
Because the Supreme Court holds that the parental right to rear one’s children is a 
fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, potential infringements on 
                                                 
13 David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the “Free Range Kid”: Is Overprotective Parenting the 
New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947, 953 (2012). 
14 Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826, 831 (Md. 1986) superseded by statute as stated in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 
829 A.2d 611 (Md. 2003).  
15 Broadwell ex rel. Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Tenn. 1994). 
16 Id. at 476 (citing Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn. 1993)). 
17 2 UTAH PRAC., Utah Family Law § 62A-4a-201, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2018). 
18 Florida Dept. of Children and Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2004) (“Parents have a 
fundamental liberty interest, protected by both the Florida and federal constitutions, in determining the care 
and upbringing of their children.”).  
19 Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
20 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
21 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (Respondent was a parent who objected to the grandparents’ 
(petitioners) claim for visitation rights with their grandchild and the Supreme Court dismissed the 
grandparents’ claims). 
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that right by states are subjected to strict scrutiny review.22 This means that a state 
government must show that: (1) there is a “compelling state interest in the action it is 
taking,” and (2) “that the action is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”23 In the area of 
neglect laws, the compelling state interest is child safety and protecting children from 
harm or the risk of harm. Keeping children safe is an unquestionably compelling state 
interest, so the issue then comes down to balancing the risk of child harm while 
preserving parental choice.24 
 Although child neglect and the risk of children being left in dangerous situations 
is undoubtedly a valid state interest, balancing this state interest with parental rights 
becomes thorny and problematic when states try to define neglect. Confusion should be 
expected, though, given that at its root, neglect is the absence of doing something and the 
harm or risk of harm that this absence of action creates. This lack of a clear and uniform 
definition of neglect leads states to have a vast range of standards for child neglect, many 
of which are upheld despite their inherent ambiguities.25 
A. Federal and State Development of Neglect Statutes 
The ambiguous language of Illinois DCFS’s Allegation 74 contributes to its over 
application in unwarranted contexts. Unfortunately, the vagueness of Allegation 74 is not 
an isolated issue. Definitions and standards of child neglect in both federal and state 
statutes reveal an unclear national conception of neglect that often results in inconsistent 
applications. Therefore, before turning to Allegation 74 in Illinois, it is important to 
understand the broader context and development of child neglect laws nationwide.  
1. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) 
Arguably the most significant federal legislation that tackles child neglect is the 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (CAPTA) and its subsequent 
reauthorizations.26 This Act was the federal legislature’s first step into an area of law that 
was previously exclusively subject to state discretion.27 States are not required to follow 
CATPA, but it does provide funding to states’ Child Protection Services (CPS) if they 
meet certain standards in responding to child abuse.28 The original bill, introduced in 
1971, did not include any definition of child abuse or neglect; however, in the 1989 
reauthorization of CAPTA, child abuse and neglect were defined as “the physical or 
mental injury, sexual abuse or exploitation, negligent treatment, or maltreatment of a 
                                                 
22 David Pimentel, Protecting the Free-Range Kid: Recalibrating Parents’ Rights and the Best Interest of 
the Child, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 29 (2016). 
23 Id.  
24 Pimentel, supra note 13, at 960. This is particularly relevant given the recent shift towards overprotective 
parenting, which is fueled in part by the “stranger danger” fear, even though child abductions by strangers 
in the U.S. have become statistically negligible.  
25 Id. at 973. 
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5116 (2012). 
27 David Pimentel, Fearing the Bogeyman: How the Legal System’s Overreaction to Perceived Danger 
Threatens Families and Children, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 235, 243 (2015). 
28 Howard Davidson, Federal Law and State Intervention When Parents Fail: Has National Guidance of 
Our Child Welfare System Been Successful?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 481, 485 (2008). 
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child by a person who is responsible for the child's welfare.…”29 Congress ultimately 
found that the 1989 definition was over-inclusive and led to a sharp rise in the number of 
unsubstantiated child abuse and neglect reports nationally.30 Congress then amended the 
definition to “any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which 
results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an 
act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm.”31 With this 
amendment, Congress was on the right track by removing “negligent treatment” from the 
definition of negligence. It attempted to replace types of injury, exploitation, and 
treatment with more relevant factors to better evaluate in a potential neglect or abuse 
case: the resulting harm or risk of harm to the child. However, the amendment did not go 
far enough because it failed to provide a narrowed, unambiguous definition of what harm 
or risk of harm encompasses in a neglect case. 
The key language from the 1989 amendment is “imminent risk of serious harm,” 
which is overbroad in its reach. For example, how likely must the risk be to be considered 
“imminent” and what types of situations, in terms of neglect, count as “serious harm?” It 
is nearly impossible for a parent to protect his or her child from all imminent risks of 
serious harm that are a part of everyday life. Consider a child in a vehicle moving at 
seventy-five miles per hour down the highway where injury from a car accident is a 
serious harm that could occur at any moment, thus making it a situation with imminent 
risk for serious harm.32 While the amended CAPTA language was meant to narrow the 
statute’s definitions of abuse and neglect, these unclear terms left an opening for states to 
create similarly ambiguous neglect statutes ripe for over application by state child 
protective services.33 
2. Vague Language in State Child Neglect Laws 
While not binding, CAPTA does supply guidelines for language to be used in 
states’ child neglect laws and provides funding incentives for states that model their 
neglect statutes after CAPTA.34 Several state definitions of abuse and neglect contain 
language that closely resembles the language in CAPTA, including defining neglect as a 
risk of harm.35 However, most state definitions of child abuse and neglect are 
                                                 
29 Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption, and Family Services Act (CAPTA) of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-294, 
sec. 101,  
§ 14(4), 102 Stat. 102, 116. 
30 Pimentel, supra note 27, at 244. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 5106g (2012). 
32 Pimentel, supra note 27, at 279. 
33 Id. at 270. 
34 David Manno, How Dramatic Shifts in Perceptions of Parenting Have Exposed Families, Free-Range or 
Otherwise, to State Intervention: A Common Law Tort Approach to Redefining Child Neglect, 65 AM. U. L. 
REV. 675, 684 (2016). 
35 See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (CWIG), DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2016), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf; see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(25)(a) 
(2017) (defining “neglect” as “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent, guardian, or custodian of a child 
to provide that child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter, or medical care, if that inability or 
unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child's health or welfare”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
600.020(1)(a)(1) (West 2018) (defining “[a]bused or neglected child” to include “a child whose health or 
welfare is harmed or threatened with harm when [h]is or her parent, guardian . . . or other person exercising 
custodial control or supervision” allows such harm to be inflicted upon the child); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-
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intentionally vague and far-reaching so as to allow states’ CPS wide-ranging discretion in 
determining whether a child is a victim and whether he or she should be removed from 
the household.36 While state CPS should have substantial discretion to pursue neglect and 
abuse cases, retaining definitions and terms that are too broad gives CPS little guidance 
and leads to unwarranted investigations of parents whose legal and deliberative parenting 
decisions are misconstrued as neglect.  
The West Virginia and Maryland child neglect statutes exemplify the broad, 
directionless language CAPTA aimed to cure. Under West Virginia law, “‘[n]eglect’ 
means the unreasonable failure by a parent, guardian or custodian of a minor child to 
exercise a minimum degree of care to assure the minor child's physical safety or 
health.”37 The statute does not define what “unreasonable failure” or “minimum degree of 
care” mean, leaving state CPS with minimal guidance on recognizing the difference 
between reasonable and unreasonable, and no guidance on what constitutes the minimum 
degree of care. Maryland law defines neglect as: 
 
leaving a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and attention 
to a child by any parent or other person who has permanent or temporary 
care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under 
circumstances that indicate . . . that the child's health or welfare is harmed 
or placed at substantial risk of harm.38  
 
Again, this statute does not define what a “substantial risk of harm” is, or even 
what factors should be considered when determining whether a certain situation presents 
a substantial risk of harm. Nor does it describe what kinds of inattentiveness “other 
failure to give proper care and attention to a child” encompasses. Statutes like these leave 
CPS workers with too wide a range of interpretation, resulting in the statute not only 
being over applied but also applied inconsistently because CPS workers are forced to 
interpret the language on a case by case basis.39  
Occasionally, a state’s child neglect statute may be so overly broad that it is 
ultimately struck down as unconstitutional. In State v. Downey, the Indiana Supreme 
Court unanimously ruled that the state’s Neglect of a Dependent statute, when construed 
literally, was unconstitutionally vague.40 In Roe v. Conn, the Alabama Supreme Court 
held that the state’s neglect statute, which allowed a juvenile court to remove a 
“neglected child” from his or her home if the judge found that “it appears that . . . the 
child is in such condition that its welfare requires,” was also unconstitutionally vague.41 
                                                                                                                                                 
3-102(7)(a)(ii) (2013) (“Child abuse or neglect” includes “[s]ubstantial risk of physical or psychological 
harm to a child . . . .”); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-2(1)(ii) (2018) (defining “[a]bused or neglected child” 
as a child whose parent “[c]reates, or allows to be created, a substantial risk of physical or mental injury to 
the child”). 
36 Pimentel, supra note 27, at 269. 
37 W. VA. CODE § 61-8D-1 (2014). 
38 CWIG, supra note 35, at 37. 
39 Manno, supra note 34, at 693. 
40 476 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. 1985) (holding that statutory language defining neglect of a dependent as 
occurring when “[a] person having the care, custody or control of a dependent who knowingly or 
intentionally places the dependent in a situation that may endanger his life or health” failed to meet 
constitutional muster). 
41 417 F. Supp. 769, 777–78 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
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These cases are only a small sample of the overall national trend of ambiguous language 
found in neglect statutes, leaving most states’ CPS to interpret their state statutes as they 
see fit.  
Courts also employ the best interests of the child test used in child custody 
determinations, including those involving neglect and abuse allegations, which also helps 
to explain the trend of vague language in state neglect statutes.42 Courts use this test in 
particular to balance “(1) the parent's interest for family integrity; (2) the state's interest to 
protect the minor; and (3) the child's interest in safety and a stable family environment.”43 
This test concentrates on the child’s interests, yet it does not have particularized or 
standardized factors, guidelines, or measures to determine what is in the child’s best 
interest, thus providing the judge with broad discretion.44 The lack of standardization or 
concrete guidelines allows parents to “be subjected to criminal punishment without 
evidence of abuse or neglect.”45 
As discussed earlier, it is understandable that so many states have struggled to 
adequately define neglect and provide uniform, particularized standards for investigating 
and identifying neglect. As Bernard C. Fisher, former executive director of the Citizens 
Committee for Children of New York stated, “[a]s pervasive as neglect is, it's still an 
elusive category to define . . . . The intent to harm is abuse; the failure to do something is 
neglect.”46 Defining neglect requires defining what the parent has failed to do and 
specifying where the line is between failing to take proper care of one’s child and making 
a deliberate parenting decision. The consequences of failing to draw this line are well 
documented in the unsubstantiated cases that have surfaced under the enforcement of 
Allegation 74 by Illinois’ DCFS. 
II. ALLEGATION 74 IN ILLINOIS 
In October 2001, Illinois’ DCFS adopted a set of rules termed “Allegations,” which 
DCFS workers use to investigate, indicate, and register parents and guardians for child 
neglect and abuse.47 Inadequate Supervision under Allegation 74 provides a foundation 
for the indication of neglect and is described in its original language as when: “[t]he child 
has been placed in a situation or circumstances that are likely to require judgment or 
actions greater than the child’s level of maturity, physical condition, and/or mental 
abilities would reasonably dictate.”48 The original language of Allegation 74 also 
included a non-exhaustive list of “factors to be considered” when applying Allegation 74, 
including “incident factors,” “child factors,” and “caretaker factors.”49 In 2012, over 
                                                 
42 Manno, supra note 34, at 686. 
43 Id. (quoting Joyce Koo Dalrymple, Note, Seeking Asylum Alone: Using the Best Interest of the Child 
Principle to Protect Unaccompanied Minors, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 131, 143 (2006)). 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Enid Nemy, Child Neglect: It’s Hard to Define, Harder to Stop, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 1979), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1979/08/18/archives/child-neglect-its-hard-to-define-harder-to-stop-neglect-may-
be.html?_r=0. 
47 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 11, at 8. (Other factors include but are not limited to 
“precautionary measures exercised by a parent or caregiver to protect the child from harm” and “the 
dynamics of the relationship between the alleged perpetrator and the child.”). 
48 Opening Appellate Brief, supra note 6, at 4. 
49 Id. at 5–6. 
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26,000 reports were made to DCFS under Allegation 74 and 6,961 cases (26.4%) were 
indicated.50 Indication means that “a DCFS investigator conducted an investigation and 
determined that there was credible evidence that a child was abused or neglected.”51 
These cases made up nearly 30% of DCFS’s total caseload.52 
A. Updating the Definition of Neglect in Allegation 74 
All DCFS rules must conform to the state statute that authorizes DCFS to 
investigate child abuse and neglect in the first place.53 In Illinois, this is the Abused and 
Neglected Child Reporting Act (ANCRA).54 In 2001, when Allegation 74 and all other 
allegations were adopted by DCFS, ANCRA defined neglect as the “lack of necessary 
care,” which meant that “a parent or caregiver who failed to provide a child with food, 
shelter, or medical care could be found to be neglectful.”55 The legislature preemptively 
changed this language in 2012 after the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Julie Q. v. 
DCFS, which involved another overbroad allegation for the definition of injurious 
environments.56 In this case, the Court struck down Allegation 60, holding that DCFS’s 
interpretation of injurious environment exceeded the scope of its authority under 
ANCRA.57 After the Julie Q. ruling, DCFS was forced to expunge nearly 20,000 
indicated findings entered under Allegation 60.58  
Following Julie Q., the Illinois state legislature amended and narrowed the child 
neglect definition to a child subjected to an injurious environment where (1) “the child’s 
environment creates a likelihood of harm to the child's health, physical well-being, or 
welfare” and (2) “the likely harm is the result of a blatant disregard of parent, caretaker, 
or agency responsibilities.”59 This definition of neglect did not align with the definition of 
“inadequate supervision” in Allegation 74, which did not require “blatant disregard” but 
rather depended on an investigator’s interpretation of a child’s maturity, condition, or 
mental abilities.60 Allegation 74’s definition of neglect was far broader than the state’s 
                                                 
50 CAITLIN FULLER & DIANE L. REDLEAF, FAMILY DEF. CTR., WHEN CAN PARENTS LET CHILDREN BE 
ALONE? 9 (2015), http://www.familydefensecenter.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/When-Can-Parents-
Let-Children-Be-Alone-FINAL.pdf.  
51 Hearings and Appeals, ILL. DEP’T OF CHILD & FAM. SERVS. 
https://www2.illinois.gov/dcfs/aboutus/had/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2019). 
52 Id. 
53 Inadequate Supervision, FAM. DEF. CTR. (Nov. 17, 2016), 
http://www.familydefensecenter.net/tag/inadequate-supervision/ (under “Family Defense Center Continues 
to Fight for Parents’ Right to Let Kids Play” subheading). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. (citing Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1–5/11 (2019)). 
56 Id. In Julie Q., plaintiff’s estranged husband reported her to DCFS for allegedly drinking in front of their 
child and locking her in a room, even though he did not witness the event and Julie testified to being sober 
for three years at the time of the indication. Julie Q. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 995 N.E.2d 977, 
978, 979 (Ill. 2013). In its holding, the court stated that because the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting 
Act specifically removed “injurious environment” from its definition of neglect, DCFS could not re-
establish this term in an indication. Id. at 985–86.  
57 Julie Q., 995 N.E.2d at 986. 
58 Class Action Complaint, supra note 11, at 7. 
59 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3 (2019). 
60 See FULLER & REDLEAF, supra note 50, at 35 (noting that inadequate supervision occurs when “the child 
has been placed in a situation or circumstance that [is] likely to require judgment or actions greater than the 
child’s level of maturity, physical condition, and/or mental abilities would reasonably dictate.”). 
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definition of neglect (a blatant disregard of responsibilities) in ANCRA, meaning that 
DCFS in effect had developed its own standard for child neglect not checked by the state 
legislature or open for public consideration.61 Allegation 74’s definition of neglect was so 
expansive that it was possible to label the process of “growing up” as neglect—“engaging 
in activities that are beyond children’s abilities is exactly how they learn and grow.”62 
Recognizing the illegality and detrimental effects of Allegation 74’s overly broad 
neglect definition, the FDC challenged Allegation 74 in Manier v. DCFS.63 Much like 
Natasha Felix’s case, this one also involved children who were playing outside and 
allegedly beyond the view of their parent.64 In August 2015, a Cook County judge ruled 
that Allegation 74 was void because its language was beyond the scope of ANCRA’s 
definition of neglect.65 Even though the Manier case declared Allegation 74 void, DCFS 
continued to use the Allegation in its voided form to investigate, indicate, and register 
Illinois parents and guardians.66 Because DCFS continued to use Allegation 74 
unlawfully, the FDC filed a class action complaint in 2016 on behalf of its clients 
indicated under Allegation 74 and others with similar cases. The class action involved as 
many as 30,000 people, including all parents and guardians who had been registered on 
the Illinois child neglect registry under Allegation 74 in the past five years and anyone 
under investigation via Allegation 74 at the time.67  
Plaintiffs asked the court to order Illinois’ DCFS to: (1) stop using Allegation 74 
unlawfully, (2) remove those indicated under Allegation 74 and listed as child neglectors 
from the state neglect registry, and (3) allow DCFS to continue Allegation 74 
investigations only when a new, lawful version of the rule could be formally adopted and 
implemented.68 In the class action complaint, FDC estimated that in 2014, DCFS 
investigated about 23,566 cases under Allegation 74 and indicated findings in 6,588 of 
those cases.69 In 2015, they estimated that DCFS investigated about 23,312 cases under 
Allegation 74, indicating findings in 6,564 of those cases.70 In February 2017, the court 
granted class certification, allowing the lawsuit to proceed as a class action.71 With a 
class action looming, DCFS spent several months in settlement negotiations with the 
FDC.  
Finally, in May 2017, DCFS replaced Allegation 74 with new language. Inadequate 
supervision is now defined as when a child faces “real, significant and imminent risk of 
likely harm” because of a parent’s (or caregiver’s) “blatant disregard” of parental 
responsibilities, which includes supervision.72 DCFS defines “blatant disregard” as when 
the imminent risk of likely harm is so apparent “that it is unlikely that a reasonable parent 
or caretaker would have exposed the child to danger without exercising precautionary 
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62 See Inadequate Supervision, supra note 53. 
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69 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 11, at 11. 
70 Id. 
71 Updates on Key Litigation, FAM. DEF. CTR. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.familydefensecenter.net/e-
newsletter-august-2017/ (under “Nicole P. et al. v. DCFS et al.” subheading). 
72 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 300 App. B (2017).  
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measures to protect the child from harm.”73 The phrases “blatant disregard” and “real, 
significant, and imminent risk of likely harm” were added to narrow the scope of the 
Allegation and to prevent it from being overbroad like its previous version. The qualifier 
“blatant disregard” is meant to apply only to parents who are essentially unreasonable 
because they do not exercise sound judgment in protecting their child from a “real, 
significant, and imminent risk of likely harm” while supervising them. However, DCFS 
has yet to implement these changes in its procedural instructions to staff.74 Furthermore, 
the new definition of Allegation 74 still contains undefined terms that, without 
explanation or guidance on how to apply these terms, will lead to continued 
misapplication. Recognizing these issues, the FDC is still in negotiations with DCFS to 
ensure implementation of consistent procedures in line with the updated language.75  
 Although DCFS changed the language of Allegation 74 following the threat of a 
class action lawsuit, the system-wide application and enforcement of the rule has yet to 
be changed. Given DCFS’s history of wide-ranging applications of its allegations, it is 
unlikely that the problem of overbroad investigation and implementation will go away 
with this simple update to Allegation 74’s language. The consequences of the prior 
problematic language of Allegation 74 and failure to properly implement the new 
language are compounded by issues of overreporting and systemic incentives to close 
cases. 
B. Issue of Overreporting Neglect in Illinois 
Expansive or vague definitions of neglect impact many families in part due to the 
prevalence of overreporting. All fifty states have mandatory reporting requirements for 
teachers, school workers, social workers, and medical workers, and forty-nine states 
mandate that law enforcement officers report suspected cases.76 After numerous 
amendments, Illinois law currently identifies seven professions as mandatory reporters: 
medical personnel, education workers, social service/mental health workers, law 
enforcement workers, child care workers, coroner and medical examiners, and clergy 
members.77 Mandated reporters are required to make a report to DCFS if they have 
“reasonable cause to believe that a child known to them in their professional or official 
capacity may be an abused child or a neglected child.”78 In examining the nationwide 
movement towards expanding the professional categories of mandated reporters, 
Professor Thomas L. Hafemeister says that the general reason for the expansion is that 
people who are in the most frequent contact with children are more likely to notice the 
indicators of child abuse.79 This includes “changes in the child's behavior, mannerisms, 
and attitudes, which a physician who infrequently sees a child may not be able to detect. 
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74 Updates on Key Litigation, supra note 71.  
75 Id. 
76 Pimentel, supra note 27, at 266. 
77 Lisa Black & Robert McCoppin, In Child Abuse Cases, Who Are ‘Mandated Reporters’ Under Illinois 
Law?, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-child-sex-abuse-
teacher-reporting-met-20141114-story.html. 
78 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2019). 
79 Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand? Rediscovering Child Abuse and Society's Response, 36 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819, 852 (2010). 
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Indeed, the most frequent reporters today of child abuse are teachers (16.9%), police 
officers or lawyers (16.3%), and social services staff (10.6%).”80 
In suburban Chicago, a teacher notified DCFS regarding three of her fellow 
teachers for failure to report suspected child abuse and the three teachers were later 
charged. Carol Casey, the Attorney Supervisor at the Cook County Office of the Public 
Guardian, bluntly explained why every teacher should report even a whiff of suspected 
abuse or neglect:  
 
Defining what constitutes reasonable cause to believe abuse has occurred 
can sometimes be considered a gray area, Casey said. You should always 
veer toward reporting because suspicion is a pretty low standard, she said. 
Sometimes people will overthink it, talk about it. They'll say, based on 
what we see, we don't think there was abuse.81  
 
Many mandatory reporters do not have sufficient training to identify abuse and 
neglect, yet forty-six states, including Illinois, criminalize failure to report when a child 
may be at risk for abuse or neglect.82 Furthermore, most states, including Illinois, provide 
immunity from liability to all reporters of child abuse and neglect regardless of whether 
the claims end up substantiated or not.83 With no risk of liability for reporting combined 
with the threat of criminal liability for not reporting and often inadequate training in 
identifying signs of neglect and abuse, significant overreporting inevitably results. This 
does not include the countless neighbors, friends, and strangers who also, while likely 
having honorable intentions, can report ultimately unsubstantiated claims of neglect and 
abuse. 
Widespread overreporting logically leads to a significant number of cases with 
unsubstantiated findings. Indeed, on both the national and state level, the statistics of 
unsubstantiated reports are staggering. In 2011, the majority of reports across the country 
were unsubstantiated: “of those reports that CPS deemed worthy of a response, nearly 3.3 
million nationwide, 59% were either intentionally false or otherwise unsubstantiated.”84 
DCFS was aware of notably high expungement rates for appealed indications as early as 
2001. In Dupuy v. McDonald, plaintiffs alleged that DCFS “expunged 46.9% of indicated 
reports appealed to the internal review stage,” and “63.3% of indicated report appeals 
following an administrative hearing.”85 In total, 74.6% of indicated reports were 
expunged upon appeal.86 In addition to expunged cases, for the fiscal years of 2016 and 
2017, there were nearly 113,000 unfounded reports of child abuse and neglect in 
Illinois.87 Although many unsubstantiated DCFS indications are either dropped or later 
expunged, families nonetheless suffer the immediate consequences of an indication, 
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81 Black & McCoppin, supra note 77. 
82 Pimentel, supra note 27, at 267.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 268. 
85 Dupuy v. McDonald, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (N.D. Ill. 2001). 
86 Id. 
87 BEVERLY J. WALKER, ILL. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT STATISTICS: 
DATA AS OF JULY 31, 2017, 11 (2017), 
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which includes the removal of a child from the home and potential employment 
insecurity. These consequences are discussed further in Part III. The consequences 
families face because of the overwhelming amount of unsubstantiated reports are 
magnified by both incentives for DCFS to close cases quickly and the vague language 
that leaves DCFS the broad discretion to pursue allegations.  
C. DCFS Incentives to Quickly Close Cases 
Generally, state CPS departments have both financial and public incentives to close 
cases quickly or substantiate claims. If a protective agency receives a report of an abused 
or neglected child and the report is dismissed as unfounded but the child ends up being 
harmed or worse, then there is often a large public outcry.88 This exact type of public 
uproar occurred in New York City in 1995 following the death of a six-year-old girl.89 In 
its response, the city’s child welfare agency commissioner promised to remove children if 
there was any question of the child’s safety.90 This push for more thorough investigations 
and tougher consequences led to New York City’s child removal rate increase from 8,000 
to 12,000 in just two years and an increase in neglect cases from 6,658 to almost 11,000 
in three years.91 
Every year, Illinois DCFS receives over 250,000 calls to its hotline system.92 
Seeing the effects of over-reporting, this overwhelming number of calls means that DCFS 
workers are unavoidably swamped with massive caseloads, which itself provides an 
incentive to close cases as quickly as possible.93 Under Illinois state law, DCFS has up to 
sixty days to complete a child abuse or neglect investigation and decide to indicate abuse 
or neglect, or deem the case unsubstantiated; however, most investigations are completed 
within thirty days.94 Beginning in the fall of 2016, DCFS tripled its rate of abuse and 
neglect cases closed in fourteen days or less from five percent to fifteen percent in Cook 
County under its new initiative “Blue Star.”95 In an investigation conducted by The 
Chicago Tribune in May of 2017, DCFS frontline investigators, who did not wish to be 
identified, told reporters that “they now face unrealistic deadlines and new pressure to 
close cases.”96 The Chicago Tribune investigated DCFS case closure rates and found that 
DCFS had launched a contest that awarded $100 gift cards to the top two DCFS 
                                                 




92 Christy Gutowski, Chances to Intervene Missed in Baby's Short Life, Review Reveals, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 
30, 2013), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-12-30-ct-child-abuse-lamya-met-20131230-
story.html.  
93 See David Jackson & Gary Marx, DCFS Under Fire for Quickly Closing Child Abuse Investigations, 
CHI. TRIB. (May 24, 2017, 7:01 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-dcfs-hearing-
met-20170523-story.html (reporting that DCFS workers feel “overwhelmed” and are often “in tears” 
because of their large caseloads). 
94 ILL. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT A CHILD ABUSE OR 
NEGLECT INVESTIGATION 5 (2014), https://www.illinois.gov/dcfs/aboutus/Documents/whatcani.pdf. 
95 David Jackson et al., After Three Kids Die Despite DCFS Involvement, It Urges Faster Probes, CHI. 
TRIB., (May 11, 2017, 7:07 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-dcfs-kids-met-
20170511-story.html. 
96 David Jackson et al., After Three Kids Die Despite DCFS Involvement, It Urges Faster Probes, CHI. 
TRIB., (May 11, 2017, 7:07 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-dcfs-kids-met-
20170511-story.html. 
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investigators who closed the most cases in a month, and a $50 gift card to the third-place 
investigator.97 Outcry from the public and Illinois state legislature was swift and the 
Senior Deputy Director of DCFS told the Tribune that DCFS was in the process of 
reviewing whether disciplining the supervisors who organized the contest would be an 
appropriate response.98 
Financial incentives and pressure to close cases quickly creates a double-edged 
sword for the children and families investigated. Rushing through case investigations 
allows cases that should be further investigated to slip through the cracks and increases 
the likelihood of ultimately unsubstantiated cases to be indicated because of an 
inadequate investigation. Based on DCFS’s history of pressuring workers to conclude 
investigations quickly and its broad use of allegations leading to a significant amount of 
unsubstantiated cases, it is unlikely that the updated language will be enough to stop 
DCFS from its sweeping use of Allegation 74 to indicate innocent parents and guardians. 
D. The Updated Language of Allegation 74 Continues to be Problematic 
As previously stated, the new language of Allegation 74 states that there is 
inadequate supervision when a child is exposed to a “real, significant and imminent risk 
of likely harm” because of the parent’s or caregiver’s “blatant disregard of parental or 
caregiver responsibilities of care and support, including supervision.”99 While this 
language is certainly narrower than its unlawful predecessor, because Allegation 74 does 
not provide any guidance or a definition for what a real, significant, and imminent risk of 
likely harm is, it still has the propensity to be overly broad and unevenly applied.  
This language resembles CAPTA’s definition of child abuse and neglect, which 
includes “an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm.”100 
Law professor David Pimentel stresses that a major flaw of neglect statutes, including 
Allegation 74, is their use of risk in defining neglect because this implies that by 
parenting a certain way, risk can be eliminated or avoided.101 Furthermore, by defining 
neglect in terms of risk, statutes implicate “relatively innocuous decisions—certainly 
within the purview of parental discretion—but that involve inherent risk, such as 
allowing children to participate in sports activities, or piling children in the car to go on a 
family vacation, both of which carry the risk of serious injury.”102 Like CAPTA, 
Allegation 74’s “significant and imminent risk of likely harm” fails to distinguish 
between reasonable risks of harm, which are inevitable in any child’s life, and 
unreasonable risks of harm.103 
 Allegation 74’s use of “imminent,” also found in CAPTA’s definition of neglect, 
should ideally narrow the scope of its application to only imminent risk situations. 
Unfortunately, this word further muddies the boundaries of what types of risk should be 
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considered in an investigation.104 Dictionary definitions of “imminent” include “likely to 
occur at any moment; impending,” and “ready to take place.”105 It is reasonable for 
Illinois and other states to want to prevent harm that is likely to occur and should be 
prevented in abuse and neglect situations. However, “imminent” ultimately serves to be 
both over and under inclusive in describing situations of risk. For instance, a child 
routinely exposed to known carcinogens under this standard would likely not be 
considered neglected because the resulting harm would not be imminent.106 But, 
permitting a child to play contact sports or allowing a child to do something as simple as 
climb a tree involve exposing a child to risk of real, significant, and imminent harm.107 
Therefore, the term “imminent,” while likely added in an attempt to narrow the scope of 
the risk of harm due to inadequate supervision, ends up encompassing situations that do 
not involve neglect and leaves out others that would.  
In Allegation 74’s current form, DCFS tried to further specify the harm of 
inadequate supervision by adding “likely harm” and due to “blatant disregard” from the 
parent or guardian. “Blatant disregard” is defined in Allegation 74 as “an incident where 
the real, significant, and imminent risk of harm would be so obvious to a reasonable 
parent or caretaker that it is unlikely that a reasonable parent or caretaker would have 
exposed the child to the danger without exercising precautionary measures to protect the 
child from harm.”108 This explanation tries to clarify a situation in which supervision is 
inadequate, but it still runs into the same issues of vagueness and over-inclusivity as the 
terms discussed previously because DCFS does not define what the range of likelihood 
should be for either harm or blatant disregard, nor does it provide any guidance on what 
is “significant.” 
The “likely harm” language in Allegation 74 is equally problematic. For many of 
the cases challenging Allegation 74 and handled by FDC, a parent intentionally allowed 
his or her child to play, walk, or travel unsupervised or left them unattended for very brief 
periods of time, such as leaving a child in a car for a matter of minutes to run a quick 
errand. Recalling Natasha Felix’s case, she allowed her children to play in the adjacent 
park for about thirty minutes before a DCFS hotline call was placed.109 In Nicole P.’s 
case, her three boys were roughhousing and her youngest son sustained some scratches 
and bruises.110 She was indicated under Allegation 74 for failing to supervise her children 
and stop the roughhousing.111 Deona W., a licensed child caregiver and college student, 
was another named plaintiff in the Nicole P. class action complaint.112 At the time, she 
was living with a friend when the father of her friend’s child dropped the child off to 
leave in her friend’s care without telling Deona.113 The mother fell asleep at some point 
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and while Deona was upstairs in the house reorganizing her closet, the child wandered 
outside where she was found by police officers, who returned her to the house and placed 
a hotline call to DCFS.114 Deona was subsequently indicated under Allegation 74.115  
In all of these cases it is important to analyze the likely harm. In cases where 
children are outside alone, the three immediate dangers that come to mind are a child 
being abducted, harmed by a stranger, or getting hit by a car. While it is normal for 
parents to have nightmarish fears over “stranger danger” and the often ghastly aftermath 
of abducted child cases, data demonstrates that children are significantly safer today than 
children growing up two decades ago.116 In 2014, the FBI’s National Crime Information 
Center had 332 active files on stranger abductions of minors and the National Center for 
Missing and Exploited Children cites that in 2016, there were 1,419 attempted abductions 
of children in the U.S.117 In fact, children are two and a half times more likely to die by 
drowning in a swimming pool and twenty-six times more likely to die in a car accident 
than to be abducted by a stranger.118 People generally are also over three times more 
likely to be struck by lightning than a child is likely to be abducted by a stranger.119 
Therefore, the fear of children being in immediate danger of stranger abduction is 
realistically unwarranted.  
In terms of children being hit by cars, 4,735 pedestrians were killed by cars in the 
U.S. in 2013, and of those pedestrians only 236 (5%) were children aged 14 or 
younger.120 These statistics, however, are at odds with the general trend in recent years 
towards overprotective parenting that has saturated the mindsets of both parents and state 
CPS agencies.121 For DCFS to be able to fully and competently analyze whether a harm is 
likely when investigating neglect under Allegation 74, DCFS needs to implement better 
standards and training regarding what constitutes a likely risk, as opposed to risks that, 
while in popular culture may seem likely, are merely speculative. 
In addition to the vague language of Allegation 74, “DCFS’s rule for inadequate 
supervision allegations includes [twenty-one] factors that investigators should consider 
when investigating an inadequate supervision allegation and provides great discretion to 
investigators to apply those factors.”122 On the surface, guiding factors for DCFS 
investigation seem helpful because they provide more direction to DCFS workers. 
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Unfortunately, DCFS’s formal training policies do not teach investigators how to 
evaluate these factors.123 This means that in addition to trying to interpret the vague 
language of Allegation 74 to a possible inadequate supervision case, DCFS investigators 
must also consider almost two dozen factors in their investigation—all within the short 
period that DCFS investigators are allotted for case investigation. One factor 
investigators must consider under Allegation 74 is the child’s maturity level and capacity 
to appropriately respond to emergency situations.124 No formal policies, guidelines, or 
training teach DCFS investigators how to properly evaluate children to determine 
whether their maturity level meets the level deemed acceptable by DCFS.125 This factor, 
like many others under Allegation 74, is further complicated by the fact that DCFS does 
not elaborate on what an acceptable maturity level looks like.126 
The FDC’s extensive review of Illinois DCFS’s inadequate supervision cases 
showed that many parents were in fact being indicated based on only two factors: (i) the 
child or children’s age and (ii) the duration of the time that the child or children were left 
alone.127 The FDC found that in many of its Allegation 74 cases, DCFS did not document 
any specific risk of harm to the child but indicated the parent nonetheless, subjecting 
them to all of the consequences that come with being indicated as a form of neglect.128 
Importantly, FDC notes that the time in which a child was left alone its Allegation 74 
cases is never long and is often under half an hour.129 Before the change in Allegation 
74’s language, the Illinois Appellate Court expunged these indicated cases because DCFS 
failed to consider all factors and “provide real evidence of the likelihood of harm 
resulting from the inadequate supervision.”130 These decisions show the need for not only 
clearer language in Allegation 74 but also for investigators to be better trained in 
determining whether inadequate supervision is truly present in a given case. 
E. Effects of Allegation 74 on Parents and Guardians 
While states generally encourage the reporting of child neglect cases, overreporting 
and improperly indicated findings have significant negative consequences for the adults 
involved. If an individual’s case results in an indicated finding, then the finding and the 
parent or guardian’s identifying information is entered into the Illinois State Central 
Register for a time period of anywhere between five to fifty years.131 Those indicated 
under Allegation 74 remain on the registry for five years, unless their indication is 
expunged on appeal.132 The database is described as “confidential,” but is actually 
accessible to thousands, “including doctors, schools, courts, and certain employers.”133 
This means that “[s]tate police, physicians, grand juries, legal supervisors of children, law 
enforcement agencies, school superintendents, welfare agencies, and anyone the [DCFS] 
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Director authorizes for research purposes” have access to a person’s indication on the 
registry, and this can have devastating effects on an individual’s ability to care for his or 
her children and find employment.134 
Before an investigation is even completed, a DCFS investigator can have an 
individual tested for drugs, divulge confidential information, or be separated from his or 
her children.135 A DCFS investigation and indication can also be devastating to a person’s 
employment opportunities, especially if that person works with children. An individual 
who works in DCFS-licensed facilities such as group homes, child welfare agencies, 
foster homes, and day care centers will likely be put on a “protective plan” during the 
investigation, which prevents the person from working with children or requires 
monitoring of the individual’s work with children.136 Protection plans generally last the 
entire investigation, which can take over two months, and if a person’s employer is 
unable to find suitable work for the employee in alignment with the protection plan, the 
employee can be suspended with or without pay or, at worst, terminated.137 A parent or 
guardian indicated under a DCFS allegation can be prohibited from working in the entire 
childcare field, as childcare facilities are mandated to verify whether potential hires have 
been indicated through DCFS.138 DCFS investigators can also require a “safety plan” to 
be implemented, which means that while the investigation is ongoing the children at the 
center of the investigation can be placed outside of the home or only allowed to see their 
parent or guardian with supervision.139 While safety plans are supposed to be voluntary 
and require a parent to sign on, the experience is often coercive and can be implemented 
even when there is no evidence of threatened danger to the child.140 
Furthermore, background checks for school district employees include checking the 
Illinois State Central Register.141 If an individual is listed in the registry, he or she can be 
prohibited from activities like helping with after-school care, coaching a child’s sports 
teams, or adopting a child.142 There is no question that people who neglect or abuse 
children should not be allowed to work or take care of children as part of their 
professional responsibilities. However, as seen previously, many Illinois residents are 
being investigated or indicated, only to have their cases later expunged.143  
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State and federal courts have acknowledged that being indicated or registered under 
“DCFS regime” damages a person’s “reputation and employment opportunities, and 
implicates a constitutional liberty interest.”144 Disruptions in employment, needing to hire 
childcare while dealing with the investigation, and possible legal expenses to fight an 
indication all add to financial stress experienced by the parent or guardian being 
investigated.145 While some of these effects are unavoidable in any type of child neglect 
or abuse investigation, the severe disruption in peoples’ lives further underscores the 
need for improved language in Allegation 74 and improved DCFS investigation training. 
Even if a parent is not indicated, the DCFS investigation alone can have significant and 
sometimes irreversible consequences on a family’s economic security and home life. 
While no child protection agency will be able to ensure that only guilty parents are 
investigated or indicated, changes in Allegation 74 language and DCFS training would 
help lower the significant number of innocent parents that DCFS indicates under 
Allegation 74 and other allegations.  
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ALLEGATION 74 AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES 
This Part will discuss several policy impacts of Allegation 74 and will make 
concrete suggestions for changing its language and application. First, this Part will 
discuss the media’s focus on parents targeted by neglect statutes who have made 
deliberate decisions to allow their children to play, travel, or be left on their own—these 
parents identify with the “free-range” parenting movement. Second, this Part asserts that 
this group of parents, usually white and middle-to upper-class, should not be the focus of 
this attention because minority and lower-income parents are more likely to experience 
intrusion from DCFS investigations and are also less likely to have the resources to 
defend themselves against unjustified investigations and indications. Finally, I argue that 
the Illinois DCFS needs to take additional steps to narrow and specify Allegation 74’s 
language to avoid these policy issues, and I will provide suggestions for changes in both 
language and application of the Allegation. 
A. The Spotlight on Free-Range Parenting 
When researching problematic child neglect statutes, it does not take long to come 
across media and scholarly articles on the “free-range” parenting movement and to see 
how this parenting style is at odds with current vague and overbroad state neglect 
statutes.146 Free-range parents prioritize the importance of “giving children autonomy, 
allowing them to play outdoors unsupervised, to walk or ride a bicycle to school or a 
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friend's house. These parents believe that this autonomy is important in helping children 
develop a sense of responsibility and self-sufficiency.”147 Free-range parents are not 
simply letting their children run wild, but rather are making particular decisions about the 
best way to raise their children while teaching them about autonomy, independence, and 
responsibility. Importantly, these parents are often described as “highly educated and 
highly informed.”148 Unfortunately, these parenting decisions are not frequently seen as 
an alternative parenting methodology but as a form of neglect.149 One noticeable 
commonality among the most high-profile free-range parenting cases is that advocating 
parents are white, often educated, and middle class.150 While many free-range parents 
have faced consequences under the neglect laws in their state, Utah is the first state to 
protect the rights of free-range parents with its own free-range parenting law.151 To create 
this law, the Utah legislature had to change its definition of neglect152 so that it does not 
include (in and of itself) traveling to and from school, playing outdoors, and leaving 
children unattended in a vehicle under certain conditions.153 Utah’s bill, while the first of 
its kind, may signal a growing trend in coming years towards more free-range friendly 
parenting laws. 
B. Impact of Allegation 74 and Similar Legislation on Minority and Lower Income 
Parents 
 
While free-range parents also deserve protection of their parental rights, the most 
damning effects of problematic neglect laws on competent parents, including Allegation 
74, often fall on minority and lower-income parents. Neglect statutes tend to 
disproportionally impact disadvantaged families.154 Race, class, and gender prejudices 
can consciously or subconsciously influence intervention decisions where minority or 
lower-income parents make a deliberate decision about how best to raise their child, 
including when there are no alternative options for child supervision.155 Furthermore, at 
the judicial level, personal biases of judges can affect their decision-making when 
determining a parent or guardian’s moral fitness and ability to properly parent his or her 
child.156 When innocent parents who have the financial resources are wrongfully targeted 
for neglect or abuse investigations, they are able to hire child welfare experts and 
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attorneys to help fight the claims. These parents “have an advantage when trying to 
defend themselves against a claim of res ipsa abuse or neglect, because they have access 
to more qualified lawyers and medical experts, and better medical care.”157 
Unfortunately, lower income parents do not have these kinds of resources at their 
disposal.  
The disproportionate impact of neglect investigations and indications on lower 
income and minority families can be seen at the state level in the application of 
Allegation 74. In 2011, 13% of American families with preschoolers had no formal or 
pre-arranged informal child care plans.158 This statistic includes leaving children alone, a 
practice known as “self-care,” or with an older sibling. Notably, a 2015 report showed 
that parents utilizing self-care the most were white and earning at or above 200% of the 
federal poverty line.159 Despite the data showing that self-care was being used more 
frequently by white families with more financial resources, the FDC has represented 
primarily low-income African American and Latina mothers in Allegation 74 
investigations and indications.160 Furthermore, fourteen out of the twenty-one clients that 
the FDC represented in the 2015 expungement cases qualified to have all legal fees 
waived—meaning their incomes were below the poverty line. In sixteen of the FDC’s 
Allegation 74 cases, the parent or guardian indicated was a single mother or joint parent 
with a partner, but only the mother was indicated for inadequate supervision.161 
Additionally, immigrant mothers were disproportionately more likely to be indicated 
under Allegation 74, even though they had some of the lowest rates of relying on self-
care in the previously cited reports.162 These statistics show that, in line with the “well-
documented” biases from DCFS investigators and judges present in DCFS investigations 
as a whole, these biases are also present in Allegation 74 cases.163 
Free-range parents who are unfairly targeted under neglect laws deserve to have 
their stories heard. However, the majority of these publicized stories involve white, 
middle-class families who have more resources to fight unwarranted neglect 
investigations and charges.164 In fact, the woman who coined the “free-range parenting” 
movement fits this very profile.165 The focus of media, academics, and public outrage 
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alike needs to shift to the minority and lower income parents who: (1) may not identify 
with the free-range parenting movement but are still being unfairly targeted by neglect 
laws and CPS, and (2) have fewer resources and are in a more vulnerable position to be at 
the mercy of both CPS and the courts. Biases and prejudices not only lead to higher rates 
of investigation and indication for lower income and minority parents but can also 
influence a parent’s willingness to tell his or her story for fear of having further issues 
with CPS or simply because no one will listen. 
C. Recommended Changes to Allegation 74’s Language and Application 
 
As discussed earlier, because it is so difficult to define neglect and outline 
standardized methods to investigate neglect, it will not be easy for DCFS to update 
Allegation 74’s language and its investigation methods. Nonetheless, the devastating 
effects of this overbroad and often misapplied allegation highlight the dire need for 
immediate changes to its language and application. The FDC has outlined several 
proposed changes for DCFS allegation language and its practices, which will be 
advocated for in the discussion below.166 I will also suggest further changes in the 
application and language of Allegation 74. 
1. Necessary Changes in the Application of Allegation 74 
First, the FDC’s recommendation to set a certain age at which children are 
presumed responsible enough to be left alone is an excellent start.167 In Illinois under the 
Juvenile Court Act, a parent can be found to have neglected his or her child due to 
inadequate supervision up until the age of fourteen.168 Of the known legal age restrictions 
for children left at home alone, Illinois has the highest age set at fourteen,169 whereas the 
most common age is ten.170 Illinois should conform with the majority of other states and 
lower the age at which children can be left alone to an age closer to ten years old. By 
giving parents a clear idea of when the state will more closely scrutinize their decision to 
leave a child alone, parents can make more informed decisions about how DCFS would 
be likely to view this decision.  
Second, DCFS needs to further revise its procedures for carrying out investigations. 
In March of 2018, DCFS released new investigative procedures to conform with the new 
version of Allegation 74.171 These new procedures are an improvement and include 
examples that “in and of themselves do not independently constitute ‘blatant disregard’ or 
a ‘real, significant, and imminent risk of likely harm.’”172 Examples of these exceptions 
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include leaving school-age children at home alone and running an errand while leaving a 
child in the car.173 When these exceptions occur, DCFS investigators must look at other 
factors to determine whether the situation constitutes inadequate supervision.174 While 
this is a good start for making investigatory procedures more instructive and clear for 
investigators, issues still remain.  
For instance, there are factors listed that are helpful things to consider but could 
likely still be ambiguous in application. One factor listed is the child’s “level of 
preparedness” for being left at home alone,175 when nowhere does it provide an example 
of what preparedness involves. The factors listed also have the potential to be applied 
with bias without proper training about different types of community and income levels 
of families. Going back to the preparedness factor, a low-income family might not have 
the resources to provide the child with a cell phone but may be able to prepare the child 
in other ways. Another factor that is somewhat ambiguous is how frequently the child is 
left alone, outside, or in the community.176 A working, single, low-income parent might 
leave their child alone or in the community more frequently than a two-parent household 
or one that can afford to pay for a caregiver, however, this does not mean that the child is 
more likely to be neglected. Specific factors to be considered are a good start, but they 
need to be accompanied with more specific details and guidelines on what these factors 
mean and how they can be consistently applied. 
Furthermore, for all investigations, DCFS should no longer create incentives to 
close cases as quickly as possible and should have a specific policy discouraging such 
programs. This practice only increases the likelihood of error in deciding a case and can 
lead to disastrous results in both allowing abusive or neglectful parents to keep custody of 
their children or by indicating innocent parents. DCFS should also teach its investigators 
to interpret the language of Allegation 74 in a clearer, more standardized way. For 
instance, investigators should be given clear definitions of what “significant harm” looks 
like and what “likely” means.177 If being abducted by a stranger or hit by a car are 
statistically negligible risks, these should not be considered as likely risks or potential 
harms when evaluating the child’s situation.  
DCFS should also create a standardized training instruction to teach investigators 
how to analyze all factors listed under Allegation 74.178 For instance, for factors such as 
how long it takes for the caregiver to reach the child and whether the caregiver can see 
and hear the child, DCFS needs to set better parameters.179 What is an acceptable time for 
the caregiver to reach the child? Does the caregiver need to have the child directly in his 
or her line of sight, or is it acceptable for the caregiver to be able to look out of the 
window and see the child? Factors would be helpful in guiding a DCFS workers’ 
assessment of a potential Allegation 74 situation. However, DCFS first needs to clearly 
train its workers on what the factors mean and the boundaries of their acceptable 
application. One factor that should be discarded is measuring a child’s maturity level. 
Children of the same age can have different maturity levels that are difficult to measure, 
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which makes it too subjective of a concept to be taught and standardized across all 
cases.180 Additionally, if DCFS establishes a bright line age of when a child is presumed 
responsible enough to be left alone, ideally set at ten years old to be in line with my 
proposed statutory change, there should be less of a need to look at the child’s maturity 
level. 
DCFS should also train hotline workers to ask more questions from callers when a 
child is seen playing at a park or walking to school, like in so many of the free-range and 
FDC cases mentioned. Hotline workers should ask if the caller has spoken to the child, if 
the child said that his or her parents know where he or she is, or if the parent is in close 
proximity to the child (e.g. in a house across the street). Asking these kinds of questions 
will help DCFS investigators early on in determining the parent’s awareness at the time 
of the call. It will also help callers get more accustomed to asking children about their 
situation first before calling DCFS, which can help reduce the number of reports made on 
innocent and knowledgeable parents. 
2. Language Changes to Allegation 74 
As previously discussed, Allegation 74’s current language is still problematic in its 
clarity and scope. One of the most concerning terms is the word “imminent,” which 
proves to be both under and over inclusive because it excludes harms that are not 
immediately about to happen and includes harms that, while technically imminent, are 
simply a part of daily life or are difficult to avoid. Because the very definition of 
“imminent” is problematic for Allegation 74 and its scope, DCFS should remove the term 
completely. While imminence conveys the time-sensitive nature of the harm, the terms 
“real and significant” convey both the timeliness and seriousness of the harm so that 
“imminent” is unnecessary. 
If DCFS continues to use “imminent” in Allegation 74, I agree with Professor 
David Pimentel that Allegation 74’s current description of the risk of harm should be 
changed to a significant and imminent risk of likely harm that is “grossly 
disproportionate” to the risks of the next best alternative form of supervision.181 As 
espoused in the free-range parenting philosophy, parents usually know their child better 
than anyone else and therefore are in the best position to decide how much independence 
should reasonably be given to their child. Parental autonomy is also a fundamental liberty 
interested protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.182 Therefore, stronger language 
and a higher standard before DCFS intervention in the parent-child relationship is a 
reasonable and appropriate response that would likely help in protecting parental rights 
and cut down on the investigation of innocent parents simply choosing to raise their 
children in the way they think is best.  
Adding the “grossly disproportionate” standard would force DCFS to show that 
risk of harm to the child is grossly disproportionate to the costs and risks of the best 
alternative situation.183 For example, in the case where children walk to school by 
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themselves, DCFS would need to show that the risk of walking to school alone is grossly 
disproportionate to the risk of waiting for and riding the bus or being driven to school. 
This heightened standard will also force DCFS to more seriously evaluate the costs, risks, 
and decisions of parents under an inadequate supervision investigation and will likely 
force DCFS to take more time in fully evaluating the factors of the case before coming to 
a decision to either indicate or close the case. 
Of course, “grossly disproportionate” needs to be defined by DCFS to avoid the 
same problems of vagueness and misapplication. While this definition should be 
determined by DCFS, I offer the following definition: grossly disproportionate means 
that it would be obvious to a reasonable caregiver that the real and significant risk of 
likely harm posed outweighs the risk of the next best alternative form of supervision. 
There are still issues with this definition in terms of what types of risks should be obvious 
to a reasonable parent; however, this higher standard would nonetheless likely narrow the 
application of Allegation 74 so that non-neglectful parents making deliberate parenting 
decisions are less likely to be targeted. 
CONCLUSION 
Our country has a long history of recognizing and protecting parental rights. 
However, many states including Illinois, are influenced by the problematic language of 
CAPTA as well as the natural difficulties in defining and recognizing neglect and have 
created problematic child neglect statutes that are vague, overbroad, and often 
misapplied. Allegation 74’s legal history and broad usage demonstrate the system-wide 
issues in DCFS’s policies, training, and investigations. While the language of Allegation 
74 has been updated to fall within the scope of ANCRA and DCFS has released updated 
procedures to conform with this new definition, more improvements in Allegation 74’s 
language and application are necessary to ensure that innocent parents—free-range and 
otherwise—do not continue to be wrongfully targeted under this rule.  
The continued need for updates to Allegation 74 language and DCFS procedures is 
clear when looking at the disturbing experience of an Illinois mother that occurred in 
August of 2018 and made national headlines.184 One summer day, Corey Widen of 
Wilmette, Illinois, decided to let her 8-year-old daughter walk her dog, Marshmallow, 
around the block during which Widen was able to view her daughter for most of the 
walk.185 After her daughter returned, Widen was expecting a playmate of her daughter’s 
to arrive at the door but to her surprise, it was the police. The police had been contacted 
by an anonymous caller who reported a child walking a dog alone and while the police 
quickly concluded that her daughter was not in danger, according to Widen “[a]pparently 
whoever call[ed] the police didn’t think the police were a good enough judge of what was 
okay and not okay. Then they called DCFS. The police did not call DCFS.”186  
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After a weeks-long investigation in which DCFS interviewed Wilden’s friends, 
family members, and even her children’s pediatrician, DCFS found no wrongdoing and 
decided against indicating Wilden.187 When asked about the investigation by the Chicago 
Tribune, a DCFS spokesperson said that “We want to investigate . . . because you just 
don’t know . . . . You also don’t want to say (to the public), ‘Don’t call us unless it’s 
serious.’”188 Wilden, however, felt the damage had already been done, stating that the 
whole experience had been “traumatizing” for her family and that she was “mom-
shamed” for her parenting decision.189 Despite her ordeal, Widen recognized how lucky 
she was to have resources and connections to attorney friends who were able to help her 
and stated that since her ordeal went public, she has had over 100 people write to her with 
some even asking for help.190 The FDC Executive Director Rachel O’Konis Ruttenberg 
also commented on Widen’s case and praised her for shedding light on the racial and 
income disparities that often affect the outcomes of DCFS investigations: “‘[t]he 
consequences are so much more dire for low-income and families of color’… [w]hen 
DCFS first comes in contact with a family, those with financial means tend to hire a 
lawyer to assist them… but ‘low-income families don’t have the resources to get an 
attorney and get in front of it.’”191  
Widen’s story represents perhaps the best-case scenario for what can happen after 
DCFS is called for a potential inadequate supervision allegation. Widen was in a 
privileged position to fight the investigation, her family was not separated, her job was 
not threatened or severely interrupted, she was not financially devastated from fighting 
the investigation, and her case took weeks to resolve instead of months or years. 
However, it is important to remember that this traumatic ordeal occurred after DCFS had 
updated its Allegation 74 language and procedures. This level of investigation into a girl 
walking her dog around the block demonstrates that there are still significant issues with 
Allegation 74’s language and application that require remedy. Had some of the changes I 
proposed above been in place at the time of the incident, it is very well possible that this 
investigation could have been avoided and saved both Widen and her family from stress 
and disruption, as well as DCFS resources. While DCFS has made progress in clarifying 
Allegation 74 and its application, further specification of its language and factors, as well 
as more rigorous staff training will help ensure that innocent parents like Corey Widen, 
Natasha Felix, and countless other innocent parents are not wrongly targeted by DCFS. 
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